|
People v Bellamy |
||
|
2011 NY Slip Op 04483 |
||
|
Decided on May 24, 2011 |
||
|
Appellate Division, Second Department |
||
|
Published by New York State Law Reporting
Bureau pursuant to |
||
|
|
||
|
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision
before publication in |
||
|
|
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK APPELLATE DIVISION:
SECOND JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT
DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, J.P.
ANITA R. FLORIO
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL
ROBERT J. MILLER,
JJ.
2008-07023
2010-01083
(Ind. No. 2194/94)
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M.
Castellano and Sharon Y. Brodt of counsel), for appellant.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (David Crow, Law Offices of Thomas
Hoffman, P.C., and Cravath,
Swaine & Moore, LLP [Evan R.
Chesler, Darin P. McAtee, Antony L. Ryan, Craig A. Batchelor,
Dashene A. Cooper, and Robert A.. Miranne], of counsel), for
respondent (one brief filed).
DECISION & ORDER
Appeals by the People (1) from an order of the Supreme Court,
Queens County (Blumenfeld, J.), dated June 27, 2008, which,
after a hearing, granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPL
440.10 to vacate a judgment. of the same court (Thomas, J.), rendered January 16,1996,
convicting him of murder in the second degree and criminal
possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury
verdict, and imposing sentence, and directed a new trial, and
(2), as limited by their brief, from so
much
of an order of the
same
court dated January 14, 2010, as, upon renewal, and, after a hearing, adhered to its
original determination in the order dated June 27, 2008.
ORDERED that the appeal from the order dated June 27, 2008, is
dismissed, as that order was superseded by the order dated
January 14, 2010, made upon renewal; and it is further.
The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and a
related weapons charge, related to a 1994 stabbing in Far
Rockaway, Queens. On appeal, the judgment of conviction was
affirmed (see People v Bellamy, 247 AD2d 399). In 2006
the defendant moved pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the
judgment of conviction. At a hearing on the motion, the
defendant proffered the testimony of an informant, to whom an
individual named Ishmael had confessed to committing the
homicide with an unapprehended accomplice. The informant
testified about three conversations with Ishmael and provided an
audio recording. which he claimed contained the voice of Ishmael
during the third conversation. The Supreme Court granted the
defendant's motion, vacating the judgment of conviction based
upon newly discovered evidence "of such character as to create a
probability that had such evidence been received at the trial
the verdict would have been more favorable to the
defendant" (CPL 440.10[1 ] [g]).
The People then moved, inter alia, for leave to renew their
opposition to the motion and [*2]to reopen the hearing. The
Supreme Court granted renewal. At the subsequent hearing, the
People proffered testimony from the informant retracting his
testimony of the confession and admitting that he faked the
audio recording, as well as testimony from the person who had
pretended to be Ishmael on the recording. The Supreme Court
determined that the tape recording had been faked, but credited
the informant's original testimony that Ishmael had confessed to
him during previous conversations and discredited his
recantation of that testimony. The Supreme Court accordingly,
upon renewal, adhered to its original determination vacating the
defendant's convictions. The People appeal.
"N~w evidence has been discovered since the entry of a judgment
based upon a verdict of guilty after trial, which could not have
been produced by the defendant at the trial even with due
diligence on his part and which is of such character as to
create a probability that had such evidence been received at the
trial the verdict would have been more favorable to the
defendant; provided that a motion based upon such ground must be
made with due diligence after the discovery of such alleged new
evidence."
The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence every fact essential to support the motion (see
CPL 440.30[6]; People v Tankleft, 49 AD 3d 160,
179-180). The power to vacate a judgment of conviction on the
ground of newly discovered evidence rests within the discretion
of the hearing court. The court must make its final decision
based upon the likely cumulative effect of the new evidence had
it been presented attrial (see People
v
Tankleft,
49 AD 3d at 178-181).
The Supreme Court properly determined that the likely cumulative
effect of the newly discovered evidence, including the
informant's original statements to investigators and counsel
concerning Ishmael's alleged confession, his recantation of
those statements, and the testimony concerning the faked
confession tape, would have been a verdict more favorable to the
defendant (see CPL 440.1 0[1][g]). A reasonable jury
could find, as the Supreme Court did here, that the informant's
original unsolicited implication of Ishmael was truthful,
regardless of the informant's later recantation of those
statements. Moreover, the fact that the informant implicated
Ishmael and an accomplice. who were the same people as were
implicated in a police report contemporaneous to the homicide.
could raise a reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds, especially
given the less than overwhelming evidence against the defendant
at trial.
In light of our determination, the People's remaining contention
has been rendered academic. ANGIOLILLO, J.P., FLORIO, LEVENTHAL
and MILLER, JJ., concur.
Friday, May 27,2011 AOL: THoff93452